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I. INTRODUCTION
State constitutions play an important role in the mix of American dual
sovereignty. In areas as broad as due process and as narrow as cruel and unusual
punishment, state courts have construed their state constitutions to cloak their
citizens with protections of liberty that the United States Constitution does not

1

Allusions to Lewis Carroll and Humpty Dumpty’s famous discourse on words are not
unusual when discussing textualism. See, e.g., Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant:
Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 585-86 & nn.1, 4 (1994); Steven B.
Price, Casenote & Comment, FIRREA’s Statute on the Standard of Liability for Bank
Directors and Officers: Through the Looking Glass of New Textualism, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 219,
219 n.1 (1993). Nor is this connection of recent vintage. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD E. STEVENSON,
STATES’ RIGHTS AND NATIONAL PROHIBITION 104 (1927) (quoting CHARLES WARREN,
SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 55 (1924)). Lewis Carroll published Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland in 1865 and Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found
There in 1872.
2

Associate Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at
Little Rock.
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provide.
While such expansions, or augmentations, of state constitutional
prerogative are certainly the exception and not the rule, they are a fertile ground for
novel legal theories. Litigants and judges who disagree with federal constitutional
doctrine may turn to state constitutional law to strike out in a different direction.
Developments in state constitutional law may become especially important as the
United States Supreme Court examines individual liberties in presently evolving
areas such as drug-testing3 and same-sex marriage.4
This tremendous latitude afforded to the states prompts the question, when and
why should courts construe state constitutional liberties more broadly than federal
constitutional guarantees? One is tempted immediately to open the interpretivist’s
toolbox and begin with textualism. Presumably, the state constitutional provision
that is worded identically to its federal counterpart carries the same meaning, while
differences in wording point to differences in meaning. However, even a cursory
examination of state constitutional law reveals that this presumption is gravely
flawed.
For example, one might suspect a substantive difference in the free speech
guarantee of the Pennsylvania Constitution—“every citizen may freely speak”5—and
that of the U.S. Constitution—“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”6 The former seems to define an affirmative right, perhaps even
placing upon government a duty to protect an individual’s free speech interest
against all who would infringe upon it, whether a public or private entity. The latter
guarantees a right in the negative, operating only as a limitation on state power. Yet
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected such a distinction.7 In contrast, the
Michigan Supreme Court found that nearly identical language in state and federal
double jeopardy clauses could be subject to disparate interpretation.8
This Article examines closely a narrow range of highly factually analogous cases,
in which state constitutional rights are asserted despite a clear lack of entitlement to
assert any federal constitutional claim. Specifically, the cases selected are those in
which private persons assert a right to conduct expressive activity, including
electoral activity, in private shopping centers during hours when the properties are
3
For example, student Fourth Amendment rights in the schools were severely curtailed in
drug-testing cases Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), and Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822 (2002). Courts in Indiana first indulged then abandoned a contrary theory predicated on
state constitutional law. See Linke v. Northwestern Sch. Corp., 734 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000), vacated by 763 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002).
4
This issue has not yet come to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the recently famous ruling of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, requiring that marriage licenses issue to samesex couples, was predicated on that state’s constitution. See Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
5

PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.

6

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

7

W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331,
1335 (Pa. 1986).
8

See Woodland v. Mich. Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 344, 345 & n.22 (Mich. 1985)
(en banc).
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held open to the general public. These cases may be referred to colloquially as “the
mall cases.” Selected here are only those cases that were decided after the federal
question became clear. The Article first inquires into the role of textualism in these
cases. The Article then examines other interpretivist modes besides textualism,
namely originalism, structuralism, and precedentialism, as well non-interpretivist
public policy arguments. The purpose of this inquiry is to clarify the role of
interpretivism in state courts’ decisions on whether to expand the scope of their state
constitutional protections for individual rights.
II. BACKGROUND: TAKING TEXTBOOK ENUMERATED POWERS TO THE MALL
A. Federal and State Constitutions
As every American high school student learns, the federal government of the
United States is one of enumerated powers. Congress has authority to regulate
commerce, for example, by virtue of Article I, section 8, clause 3, which expressly
grants the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”9 Congress may raise a Navy only by
virtue of the clause which grants that power.10 Although Article I, section 8, further
empowers Congress to make “Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States,”11 the Necessary and Proper
Clause has not been construed as a broad foundation from which Congress may
escape the limiting scheme of enumeration.12
To further clarify the limited nature of federal power, the Tenth Amendment
states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”13 The present breadth of power reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment is surely disputed.14 But the fundamental notion of limited federal
power remains intact.15 Federal sovereignty is carved out from the whole of state

9

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

10

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.

11

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

12

McColluch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (affirming that
Congressional powers are limited, even though Congress is to be granted broad discretion in
its choice of means).
13

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

14

See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1642-50
(2002). There is ample literature concerning adoption and construction of the Tenth
Amendment. See, e.g., THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES (Mark R. Killenbeck ed., 2002); RAOUL BERGER,
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER’S DESIGN 77-99 (1987); CHARLES J. BLOCH, STATES’ RIGHTS: THE
LAW OF THE LAND 31-33 (1958); STEVENSON, supra note 1, at 37-57.
15

The present vitality of limited powers doctrine has been amply explored in the literature.
See, e.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 15-30 (2001) (chapter
entitled “The Futile Idea of Limited Powers”). For an interesting comparative review of this
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sovereignty, so one may be viewed as the inverse of the other. Otherwise stated,
federal and state sovereignty together sum the whole of governmental power.
Supervening in this arrangement are the limitations on governmental power
imposed by declarations of rights, namely the Bill of Rights and analogous
declarations in state constitutions.16 The free expression guarantee of the First
Amendment in particular is phrased as a limitation on governmental power:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
redress of grievances.”17 Subsequently extended pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment to limit state as well as federal power,18 this “negative” phrasing of the
First Amendment is significant because it represents no affirmative grant of power to
the government.19 Congress may not rely on the First Amendment alone to authorize
legislation not otherwise “necessary and proper” to further Article I objectives.
Not all declarations of rights, and not all free expression guarantees, are phrased
in the negative. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights declares, “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression . . . .”20 The
American Convention on Human Rights mirrors the language of the ICCPR.21
Interestingly, the American Convention further provides that “[t]he right of
expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of
government or private controls . . . tending to impede the communication and
circulation of ideas and opinions.”22 Thus a signatory government might rely on the

federalist division of power in the modern age, see generally CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU,
STATES’ RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS (1984).
16

For a review of the origin, scope, and interpretational theory of state constitutional law,
see generally Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1326-67 (1982); see also WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS 63-98 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 1980) (describing emergence of first state
constitutions). For a similar explication of specifically state freedom of expression guarantees,
see Todd F. Simon, Independent But Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of
Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 309-20 (1985).
17

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

18

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).

19

The Fourteenth Amendment of course gives Congress a power of enforcement, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, but only to ensure that states respect the prohibition of the First
Amendment.
20

ICCPR art. 19(2); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19 (“Everyone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression . . . .”) and art. 20(1) (“Everyone has the
right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.”). The covenant expressly imposes
concomitant responsibilities on those who exercise the right. ICCPR art. 19(3) (requiring that
persons respect “the rights or reputations of others” and “public order, . . . health or morals”).
In ratifying the covenant, the United States was careful to declare that the covenant may not be
read to restrict rights that are already construed more broadly under domestic constitutional
law.
21

ACHR art. 13(1). The convention carries a section on responsibilities as well. See
ACHR art. 13(2). But cf. ICCPR art. 19(3).
22

ACHR art. 13(3) (emphasis added).
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convention, if constitutionally executed in domestic law, as an affirmative source of
power to further free expression interests as against other private interests, such as
property rights.23
In the state constitutions, precise language varies, but they tend to a similar
pattern: first providing affirmatively for a right of free expression, then adding that
no law may abridge that freedom.24 For example, the New York Constitution states
that “[e]very citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”25 The California
Constitution contains almost identical language, save splitting the two independent
clauses into separate sentences,26 while the Connecticut Constitution splits the same
sentiment into separate sections.27
The Massachusetts Constitution is somewhat more circumspect, declaring first
that “[t]he liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it
ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth,” then adding, by 1948
amendment,28 that “[t]he right of free speech shall not be abridged.”29 The Arizona
Constitution contains an affirmative statement of free speech rights almost identical
to that of New York and California, but no negative counterpart. 30 At the same time,
the Arizona Constitution contains no clearly affirmative statement of the right to
petition Rather, it contains a negative statement structured similarly to the
Massachusetts amendment: “The right of petition, and of the people peaceably to
assemble for the common good, shall never be abridged.”31 Notably, the latter
negative provisions in Massachusetts and Arizona are phrased in the passive voice—
“never be abridged”—and are unrestricted by any apparent grammatical subject.
Thus, the state government is not necessarily the only potential actor within the
scope of the prohibition. Arguably, these passive voice provisions, though phrased
negatively, are intended to function affirmatively, because only the power of the
23
The extent to which the U. S. Congress might augment its power through treaty
ratification and enforcement is unclear. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920)
(suggesting that treaty may empower Congress as against state power reserved by the Tenth
Amendment, but not considering countervailing private interests).
24
Simon, supra note 16, at 314. The instant study is not strictly limited to free expression
provisions, rather concerns interpretation of whatever state constitutional provisions are
invoked in Pruneyard circumstances. Other state constitutional provisions bear the same
affirmative-to-negative relationship to their federal counterparts, while some state
constitutional provisions affirmatively establish individual or electoral rights without clear
federal analogs.
25

N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.

26

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.

27

CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 4-5.

28

MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXVII.

29

MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVI.

30

ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 6 (“Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”).
31

ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 5.
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state can restrain private non-speech interests, such as the exclusive enjoyment of
private property, from abridging private speech interests, such as picketing.
These distinctions in state law are potentially significant. Constrained by both
the enumerated power provisions and the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, the
federal government is bound to respect citizens’ free expression rights as against
government power, but has no independent authority to shield or further citizens’
free expression rights as against other citizens’ legal interests. That latter power is
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Because federal sovereignty was
carved out of state sovereignty, the states presumably retain broad powers of
governance, limited in turn by their state constitutions. Insofar as a state constitution
imposes limitations akin to those of the federal Constitution, state powers are
similarly limited. But insofar as a state constitution imposes no limitations, rather
asserts affirmative citizen rights, the state may claim the ability, if not the
responsibility, to protect and further those citizen rights as against other legal
interests of citizens.
B. The State Action Requirement
This legal background sets the stage for the problem that arises when citizens
claim constitutional rights, namely the right to free expression, or concomitant rights
to participate in the political process, as against private, or non-state, actors. Under
the federal Constitution, these claims are usually doomed by the “state action”
requirement.32 In other words, absent express constitutional authority or a federal
statute “necessary and proper” to further enumerated constitutional powers, the
federal courts have no basis upon which to enforce one citizen’s constitutional rights
against the legal interests of another.33 The state governments are not so constrained.
They may seize upon an affirmative constitutional guarantee to secure citizen rights
as against contrary private interests,34 up to the point that the adverse party has a
countervailing constitutional interest, such as the right against deprivation of
property without due process of law.35 Upon this theory, the Supreme Court
recognized in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins that a state may construe its

32

For a history of the state action requirement and a call for its reexamination, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985). Professor Chemerinsky
bemoaned the rapid decline in interest in the state action doctrine from the 1950s and 1960s to
1980, but his call for a resurgence has gone largely unheeded. Id. at 503. Similarly, a reliable
stream of literature on the promise of state constitutional law to continue the momentum of
civil rights development dissipated substantially after the mid-1980s, with few noteworthy
works defying the dearth. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 66; Berger, infra note 52.
33
Shelley v. Kraemer inaugurated a famously broad interpretation of state action under the
civil rights laws, which are justified with reference to the enforcement authority granted to
Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). There may be other, more
limited exceptions. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (compelling company town
to respect religious freedom).
34

See Simon, supra note 16, at 311 (“The first amendment . . . provid[ed] a clear
prohibition that worked only against government; the majority of state provisions were and
still are affirmative grants of personal freedom that act against individuals as well as against
government.”).
35

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
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state constitutional provisions as broader—that is, providing more protection—than
the federal Constitution.36
Pruneyard arose specifically in the context of private citizens engaged in
expressive activity—high school students gathering petition signatures—in a
privately owned shopping center during hours when the property was held open to
the general public. The central question—whether those constitutional rights should
be enforceable as against private property interests—has had a peculiar history
before the U. S. Supreme Court.37
The Court initially opened the door for civil liberties to intrude upon private
property in the “company town” case of Marsh v. Alabama.38 Where the privately
held Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned the very storefronts, sidewalks, streets,
and sewers of a Mobile, Alabama, suburb, and employed the town sheriff, the Court
in 1946 reversed the trespass conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness distributing religious
literature.39 Thus, on private property that was functionally equivalent and
apparently indistinguishable from public property, the Court found it appropriate to
balance residents’ rights against the owner’s property interests, concluding that the
former “occupy a preferred position.”40 The Court expanded the doctrine in 1968 in
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., by
allowing union activists to picket peacefully in the parcel pick-up area and parking
lot outside a store in Logan Valley Plaza, a privately held shopping center.41 The
Court found the shopping center to be the “functional equivalent” of the business
district in Marsh.42
But only four years after Logan Valley, the Court backed off. In Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, Vietnam War protestors sought to handbill in a shopping center, and the
Court sided with the shopping center.43 The Court distinguished Logan Valley on
grounds that the subject of the demonstration in that case was related to the store
outside of which the demonstration occurred, whereas the antiwar demonstration in
Lloyd was unrelated to the retail purpose of the shopping center.44 That content36
447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); e.g., Simon, supra note 16, at 313 (“It is axiomatic . . . that a
state may grant greater rights than required by the federal minimum.”). This proposition has
been amply explored in the literature. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 16, at
1367-1502; William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Barry A. Spevack, Note, Expanding State Constitutional
Protections and the New Silver Platter: After They’ve Shut the Door, Can They Bar the
Window?, 8 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 186 (1976).
37

This history has been amply recounted. See, e.g., William Barnett, Note, A Private Mall
Becomes a Public Hall, 26 LOY. L. REV. 739 (1980).
38

326 U.S. 501 (1946).

39

Id. at 502, 509.

40

Id. at 509.

41

Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
42

Id. at 318.

43

Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).

44

Id. at 560-63.
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based distinction did not withstand the test of time, though. Another four years later,
in Hudgens v. NLRB, the Court plainly held that Logan Valley had been overruled,
and bluntly applied the state action requirement to control in such situations
subsequently.45
Nevertheless, the Court in Lloyd left the door cracked for modest state
intervention to regulate speech and property, to find the proper balance between both
interests, provided First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights are respected all
around.46 California took up the charge, and in Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins,47 the Court was charged with deciding whether the state had drawn the
balance within the constitutionally permissible range. In Pruneyard, high school
students had set up a table at a California mall to collect signatures in “opposition to
a United Nations resolution against ‘Zionism.’”48 Thus, as in Lloyd, the expressive
activity was unrelated to the commercial function of the shopping center.
Recognizing that the federal First Amendment would not protect the students on
private property, the California Supreme Court extended the protection of its state
free speech and petition clauses.49 The court surely anticipated a federal appeal;
dissenting Justice Richardson lamented the subordination of “private property rights”
to “‘free speech’ claims.”50 But the U.S. Supreme Court found no impermissible
transgression against the mall owners’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment interests.
Though the Court recognized that “there ha[d] literally been a ‘taking,’” it was not
the sort of unreasonable infringement of constitutional proportion that requires
compensation.51
Pruneyard has been amply criticized as an activist interpretation of the California
Constitution, and the case has not yielded a majority rule among the states.52 For
example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found it “significant that the majority [in
Pruneyard] did not analyze the constitutional sections. It appears to be more a
decision of desire rather than analytical conviction. As the dissent in [Pruneyard]
points out, the majority ignored entirely findings of fact and conclusions of law of
the trial court which would effect a contrary result by the majority.”53 The Court of
Appeals of New York observed that Pruneyard—a 4-3 decision with “not much
analysis and only tangential discussion, if it can be called that, of the State action

45

Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).

46

See Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569-70.

47

447 U.S. 74

48

Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341, 342 (Cal. 1979).

49

Id. at 347.

50

Id. at 348.

51

Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82-84.

52

But see Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 633 (1991). Professor Berger proposes a model statute for legislative
recognition of Pruneyard principles. See id. at 692-94.
53

Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 841 (Wis. 1987).
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question”—overruled California precedent only five years older54 and thus attributed
the later ruling to an “‘accident of a change of personalities in the Judges of [the]
court,’ which this court has correctly condemned as ‘a shallow basis for
jurisprudential evolution.’”55
State court decisions that subsequently contemplated the same question of
expressive activity at private-property shopping centers are compiled in an American
Law Reports Annotation by attorney Harriet Dinegar Milks.56 According to the
Annotation as updated through 2002, three-quarters of state judiciaries to consider
the question have reached a contrary conclusion to that in Pruneyard. Colorado,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey have followed the California example,57 while
Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan,58 New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon,59 Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have disagreed with the
California position.60 Not included in these counts of four and twelve is Washington,
which straddles the fence, depending on specifically which of its constitutional
provisions is at stake—though the Washington Supreme Court’s more recent antiPruneyard majority ruling seems weightier than its plurality-authored predecessor.61
III. INQUIRIES AND FINDINGS: TWO QUESTIONS, FEW ANSWERS
The dichotomy of state views on this subject offers an opportunity to study the
interpretivist modes that state courts employ to construe their constitutional

54

SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 n.5 (N.Y. 1985) (citing
Diamond v. Bland, 521 P.2d 460 (Cal. 1974)).
55

SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1214 n.5 (quoting People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894
(N.Y. 1976)).
56
Harriet Dinegar Milks, Annotation, Validity, Under State Constitutions, of Private
Shopping Center’s Prohibition or Regulation of Political, Social, or Religious Expression or
Activity, 52 A.L.R.5th 195 (1997) (subsequently updated).
57

See id. § 3.

58

For a review of state action in Michigan constitutional law prior to final decision in the
case here studied, see generally Elizabeth Hardy, Note, Post-Pruneyard Access to Michigan
Shopping Centers: The “Malling” of Constitutional Rights, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 93 (1983).
59

The decision in Oregon represents an about-face. See Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11
P.3d 228, 243 (Or. 2000), overruling Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 849 P.2d 446 (Or. 1993). Citing
only the intermediate appellate disposition of Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 958 P.2d 854
(Or. Ct. App. 1998), which was consistent with the previously announced rule of Whiffen, the
Milks Annotation fails to recognize the 2000 overruling. See Milks, supra note 56, §§ 3-4.
This omission cannot be explained as other than a substantive oversight; therefore, the latter,
authoritative decision in Stranahan will be considered here to the exclusion of its
predecessors.
60

See Milks, supra note 56, § 4.

61

Compare Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282
(Wash. 1989), with Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981)
(plurality). The term “anti-Pruneyard” will be used henceforth to indicate a rejection of the
argument to expand state constitutional liberty and should not be confused with the assertion
that Pruneyard itself was wrongly decided.
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provisions when ordinarily supreme federal law is settled and not encumbering.62
All of the cases in the Milks Annotation are highly analogous factually, involving
individual or small-group expressive activity in private shopping centers during
hours when they are held open to the public. Thus, facts are narrowly constrained to
as nearly a constant as possible in cross-jurisdictional empirical research. The legal
provisions at stake in the various state constitutions differ in their particulars—such
as text and legislative history—but are all of a kind in that they represent the express
and measured preservation of individual liberty in the context of a modern
democratic government with an independent judiciary. Thus, the interpretivist
modes, or analytical methods, through which each court approaches the same legal
problem on the same facts are comparable.
Using the shopping center factual context and the pool of case law suggested by
the Milks Annotation,63 two questions are considered here. First, when did state
courts find affirmative state constitutional language significant, and thus a basis to
distinguish textually the federal Constitution and augment state governmental power
to further individual liberty interests as against competing rights? In other words,
when did textualism matter? This analysis reveals that generally, state courts that
choose to augment state power to advance liberty interests find distinguishing
textualist arguments highly persuasive, while courts that decline to augment such
state power either reject textualism outright or stretch textualist arguments to serve
the courts’ conclusions. Interestingly, there is little or no correlation between the
value a court places on textual distinctions, and the affirmative or negative language
of the subject constitutional texts, suggesting that textualism is not objectively a
useful predictive tool, rather a rationale of convenience that a court may embrace or
reject depending on the desired outcome.
62

Professor Simon in 1985 researched disparate freedom of expression doctrines according
to state constitutional law. Simon, supra note 16, at 320-37. The Simon study was not limited
to Pruneyard-type activity or individual rights vis-à-vis private interests, but did emphasize
media concerns (libel, reporter privilege, open courts, and other issues, besides the Pruneyard
problem). Professor Simon classified state court reasoning with three approaches: The
“reactive” decision arises from state court disagreement with federal doctrine. The “primacy”
decision construes state law to the exclusion of federal law except in event of conflict. And
the “interstitial” decision fills gaps in federal doctrine. Id. at 315-17. “From among these
groups no clear method emerge[d].” Id. at 337. Moreover, Professor Simon unmasked “no
absolutists, no social philosophers, no insistent balancers, and few legal historians attempting
to resolve free expression issues at the state level.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
The author is unaware of any other prior empirical research since Pruneyard, though of
course there have been many case notes and comments. E.g., Jon A. Mueller, Comment,
Transforming the Privately Owned Shopping Center Into a Public Forum, 15 U. RICH. L. REV.
699 (1981). For an inquiry prior to Pruneyard—and one considerably more thorough than this
study in that it surveys all state constitutional variations without limitation by case facts or
subject matter—see David J. Fine, et. al, Project Report, Toward an Activist Role for State
Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 271 (1973) (with state-by-state appendix at 322-50);
see also discussion of Fine, et al., infra note 66.
63
Some deviations from the Milks Annotation, supra note 56, are here indulged, and
explanations are proffered to support those deviations. See, e.g., supra note 59 (explaining
disregard for Oregon authority cited in Annotation). The consistent intent underlying the
methodology is to capture accurately the authoritative rationales operating in each of the 17
cited jurisdictions. To this end, and to simplify the analysis, minority opinions are not treated.
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Second, if not textualism, what interpretivist modes64 do state courts employ in
construing state constitutional provisions, or what non-interpretivist policies do the
courts profess to honor? None of the post-textualist interpretivist modes emerged as
dominant, though a current of originalism ran through about half the decisions. For
the anti-Pruneyard decisions, when originalism was employed, it was regarded as
controlling.65 Structuralism—specifically the horizontal separation of powers
between judiciary and legislature—also was important, but most often appeared in a
supportive, not controlling, role. As to precedentialism, trends in state-domestic case
law were the most effective predictors of courts’ conclusions, though the courts did
not advance precedentialism as a controlling mode of analysis. At the same time,
trends in other states’ (foreign) case law were rejected as often as embraced.
Non-interpretivist public policy arguments tended to follow textualism in that
they were embraced only by the minority of courts that employed textualism to
augment state power in the name of liberty interests. Courts that declined to
augment state power tended to place little or no weight on public policy arguments,
if the arguments were recognized at all.
These findings offer few viable generalizations, which might indicate that a legal
realist would be a better predictor of expansive construction of a state constitution
than an interpretivist or public policy advocate.66 One can conclude that originalism,
64
This study considers the interpretivist modes of textualism, originalism, structuralism,
and precedentialism (both state-domestic and state-foreign). These are “the main interpretive
strategies that have become prevalent.” Robert J. Pushaw, Method of Interpreting the
Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2003); see also,
e.g., Ryan E. Mick, Justifications for a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Deference to the
States’ Moral Judgments, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 379, 382-90 (2003) (treating textualism,
structuralism, and originalism). Each of these modes will be given the barest of definition
here, full expositions being well beyond the scope of this work. For more detail, see
generally, Pushaw, supra, at 1187-1206, and Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International
Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 774 n.364 (citing PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-119 (1982); ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)).
65

Original intent has long been regarded as supreme, even over textualism. See, e.g.,
BERGER, supra note 14, at 15-16 (“That canon of construction is centuries old, as the Court
itself has point out, saying, ‘The intention of the lawmaker is the law,’ rising even above the
text.” (quoting Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903) (citing MATTHEW BACON, A
NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND, Statute I(5) (3d ed. 1768)))).
66
Cf. Simon, supra note 16, at 338 (disapproving, generally, of trend in state court
activism for “depressing lack of uniformity” in resulting doctrines); Steven M. Kamp, Note,
Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165 (1980)
(advocating state constitutional protections); Fine et al., supra note 62; Vern Countryman,
Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454, 485 (1970) (“It is scarcely possible to
exaggerate the importance of the role to be played by the state Bill of Rights during the next
100 years.”); Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for a
Renaissance, 3 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 125 (1969); Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions,
State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620 (1951) (“State court
decisions and state constitutional materials are too frequently ignored by both commentator
and counsel when civil liberties questions arise.”).
Fine et al., in 1973, thus before the Pruneyard era, offered four points of advice to
advocates of expanded state constitutional interests: (1) rely on textualism, (2) rely on foreign
precedentialism, (3) consider questions left open in existing federal constitutional doctrine,
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structuralism, and domestic precedent are most likely to play a role in a court’s
decision, so advocates for either position on state constitution litigation should be
prepared to advance their positions using these interpretivist modes. Textualism,
especially when backed up by public policy, is the better tool of the advocate for
expansive state constitutional construction; if the court decides the question to the
contrary, textualism and public policy will not likely play supportive roles.
Meanwhile, foreign precedent seems to bear dubious value no matter for which
position one wishes to advocate. Though courts considering the Pruneyard question
were likely to contemplate foreign precedent, it proved less than enduring.
IV. METHOD AND ANALYSIS: EIGHTEEN OPINIONS
AND SIX MODES OF ARGUMENT
Arguments appearing in the eighteen court opinions studied, whether arguments
that supported the courts’ conclusions or arguments that were rejected, were
classified according to interpretivist mode, or as public policy arguments. The
modes observed were textualism, originalism, structuralism, and domestic and
foreign precedentialism.67 At the outset of each of the following subsections, each
term is defined in the context of this research.68 Naturally, this classification scheme
could not be imposed rigidly on the vagaries of legal reasoning and writing. An
effort was made to distinguish distinct legal arguments according to the dominant
nature of each, and only arguments that clearly operated under multiple
classifications were cross-listed. The analysis begins with textualism, in an effort to
determine when, or whether, the textual distinctions in state constitutional terms
controlled the courts’ decisions. The analysis then moves to other interpretivist
modes and non-interpretivist public policy to determine what arguments, if not
textualist arguments, animated decisions. Data points are presented in the Table,
represented by pinpoint page numbers.

and (4) rely on novel provisions of state constitutional law that lack federal counterparts. Fine
et. al, supra note 62, at 315-19. Because the instant study is limited to a review of analytical
modes, the latter two points exceed the scope of this inquiry. This study does bolster the first
point of Fine for the advocate of expansive construction, but also shows that courts disinclined
to such construction are willing to reject textualism. To Fine’s credit, their discussion of
textualism (“linguistic variation”) includes originalism, which may have merit for advocates
on both sides. See id. at 315-16. Unfortunately for Fine, as to their second point, the instant
study shows that courts are willing to reject foreign precedent when they find it disagreeable—
though granted, it remains a worthy point for the advocate to address, as it has proven of
interest to the courts. Of course, these observations and criticisms of Fine, are limited to the
Pruneyard fact scenario, the focus of this study, and might not be valid in light of
developments in other areas of state constitutional law, such as the broad range Fine studied,
including, for example, cruel and unusual punishment, and search and seizure.
67
The term “precedentialism” is taken from Pushaw, supra note 64. The term appears as
well in Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799
(1995).
68

See supra text accompanying note 64.
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Case
Robins,
592 P2d 341
(Cal 1979)
Alderwood,
635 P2d 108
(Wash
1981)
(plural)
Batchelder,
445 NE2d 590
(Mass 1983)
Bock,
819 P2d 55
(Colo 1991)
JMB,
650 A2d 757
(NJ
1994)
[Schmid,
423
A2d (1980)]
Felmet,
273 SE2d 708
(NC 1981)
Cologne,
469 A2d 1201
(Conn 1984)
Woodland,
378 NW2d 337
(Mich
1985)
(e’banc)
SHAD,
488 NE2d 1211
(NY 1985)
W. Pa,
515 A2d 1331
(Pa 1986)
Jacobs,
407 NW2d 832
(Wis 1987)
Fiesta,
767 P2d 719
(Ariz App 1988)
Southcenter, 780
P2d 1282 (Wash
1989)
Citizens,
392 SE2d 8
(Ga 1990)
Charleston,
417 SE2d 544
(SC 1992)
Eastwood,
626 NE2d 59
(Ohio 1994)
Stranahan,
11 P3d 228
(Or 2000)
Engler,
641 NW2d 803
(Iowa 2002)
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Textualism

Originalism

346

346

114

Structuralism

Domestic
Precedent

Foreign
Precedent

346-37

113

113

593

Public
Policy

347

115

116

594

595

58-59

60

59-60

[626 & n.8,
627-28
(mixed)]

[628]

760-61
[625-26]

1208-09
(rejected)

1208

1209-10

344-45
(rejected)

346,
348-50

344,
346-47,
357-58

344-45

357
(mixed)

353,
358
(rejected)

1214
(rejected)

1214

1216-17

1215

1214

1216
(rejected)

1338-39
(mixed)

1336
(rejected)

839-

837, 841

840

838-39

721
(rejected)
1287-88
(rejected)

1287-88

61

239-42

805-06
(rejected)

1288

61

243

769-70

761,
766-67,
772-75
[627]

1209
(rejected)

1334

836,
40

62

841-44
(mixed)

845

722-23

724

1289

1290-92
(rejected)

9-10

9
(rejected)

61

242-43

805

806
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A. Textualism
Textualism, also called “strict constructionism,” is “[t]he doctrinal view of
judicial construction holding that judges should interpret a document or statute . . .
according to its literal terms, without looking to other sources to ascertain the
meaning.”69 Textualism is appealing because it does not require debate about the
weight to be accorded competing contextual factors, such as the intentions of
multiple authors or the understandings of historical readers. At the same time,
textualism may be criticized for failing to account for context beyond the four
corners of the document. Textualism is typically the first tool employed by the
interpretivist, who resorts to other interpretivist tools only when the meaning of a
text is not plain on its face. Of course, plain meaning is often a matter of
perspective, providing ample wiggle room for interpretivist or activist construction.
The constitutional provisions at issue in the cases vary in the affirmative and
negative nature of their guarantees, in comparison with or in contrast to the First
Amendment’s negative statement, “Congress shall make no law . . . .” One might
therefore expect that textualist analysis would reflect these variations. But generally,
the state courts employed textualism only when it served to distinguish the federal
Constitution and expand state constitutional rights. Courts construing their stateprotected rights in accordance with the federal Constitution tended to reject
textualism.
All five of the jurisdictions that expanded state constitutional rights on behalf of
activists in shopping centers—California, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Colorado, and
Washington—asserted textualist justifications. The constitutions of California,
Colorado, and New Jersey contain both affirmative and negative free speech and

69

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (7th ed. 1999). There is ample literature on textualism
in a variety of contexts. Though textualism is discussed—and usually disparaged—primarily
as a tool of statutory interpretation, much of the literature nonetheless considers specifically
constitutional textualism, or regards textualism sufficiently broadly as to describe
constitutional textualism. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002); Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas:
Anchoring the Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the Constitution, 10 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 351 (2002); John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees
Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489 (2001); Paul E. McGreal, There Is No Such Thing as Textualism: A
Case Study in Constitutional Method, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393 (2001) (emphasizing
textualism, “constitutional law’s Loch Ness monster,” as a non-exclusive tool); Joel K.
Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?: A Critique of
Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 849 (2000); Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling
Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819 (1999); Symposium: Textualism and
the Constitution, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1081 (1998); George H. Taylor, Structural
Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321 (1995); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right of Confrontation,
Justice Scalia, and the Power and Limits of Textualism, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323 (1991);
Mark V. Tushnet, Comment, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985). See generally, ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY (1997); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES (1985).
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press provisions. Apparently construing the affirmative provision, the California
Supreme Court wrote that the framers of the state constitution deliberately chose not
to “adopt[] the words of the federal Bill of Rights.”70 The Colorado court similarly
observed that its affirmative clause “advances beyond the negative command” of its
federal counterpart, thus distinguishing the Colorado Constitution from the First
Amendment.71
The New Jersey Constitution contains provisions almost identical to those of
California,72 and the New Jersey Supreme Court observed that the affirmative
language makes New Jersey’s free expression guarantee “more sweeping in scope
than the language of the First Amendment.”73 But the New Jersey court also took on
its negative clause. Rejecting textualism amid its very endorsement, the court stated
that identical language in state and federal constitutions does not demand like
construction.74 Quoting a pre-Pruneyard California Supreme Court decision, the
court noted that “[t]he lesson of history is otherwise: the [federal] Bill of Rights was
based upon the corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than
the reverse.”75 The New Jersey court went so far as to suggest that even constrained
by a negative provision, the legislature might be compelled to legislate in furtherance
of free speech, “as the Legislature cannot abridge constitutional rights by its
enactments [nor] curtail them through its silence.”76
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found no need to reach its free speech
and petition provisions—the latter plainly affirmative77 and the former negative, but

70
Robins, 592 P.2d at 346 (construing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Every person may freely
speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”)), aff’d, 447 U.S.
74 (1980). The statement is at once a comment on textualism and originalism, reflecting the
fact that textualism is rarely used to the exclusion of other analytical modes.
71

Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991) (construing COLO. CONST.
art. II, § 10 (“No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every person shall be
free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for the abuse
of that liberty . . . .”)).
72

N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 6 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”).
73

New Jersey v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626, 628 (N.J. 1980). This case on its own facts is
outside the scope of this study, because it involved trespass on private university property, not
on shopping center property. However, the later New Jersey case involving shopping center
property incorporated Schmid by reference. N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.
JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760-61, 770 (N.J. 1994). The incorporation of Schmid is so
thorough and essential to the holding in JMB Realty that it is impossible to understand the
JMB Realty court’s reasoning without Schmid. A deviation from the methodology is therefore
tolerated here.
74

Schmid, 423 A.2d at 625-27.

75

Id. at 626 n.8 (quoting California v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975)).

76

Id. at 627 (quoting King v. S. Jersey Nat’l Bank, 330 A.2d 1, 10 (N.J. 1974)).

77

MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX (“The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable
manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good; give instructions to their
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passive and unrestricted, i.e., with no suppressed subject (“shall not be
abridged”)78—because the court protected a candidate’s signature-gathering as a
ballot access right.79 The operative article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights begins simply, “All elections ought to be free,” and goes on to guarantee to
“all inhabitants of the Commonwealth . . . an equal right to elect officers, and to be
elected, for public employments.”80 Nevertheless, discussing the Declaration of
Rights generally, not just article 9, the court determined that the use of affirmative
language “is significant” and “reject[ed] any suggestion that the Declaration of
Rights should be read as directed exclusively toward restraining Government
action.”81 That determination served as the basis for rejecting a state action
requirement for article 9.82
Textualism was at first embraced and then rejected in Washington. Extending
the state constitution to protect environmentalist signature-gathering on shopping
center property, a supreme court plurality relied on the speech and initiative
provisions of the state constitution.83
Both provisions in Washington are
affirmative,84 with no negative counterparts, and this resemblance to the affirmative
language at issue in California and New Jersey was instrumental in reaching the
plurality’s conclusion.85 Eight years later, however, a supreme court majority
rejected textualism as impermissibly contravening originalism:
It is a 2-foot leap across a 10-foot ditch . . . to seize upon the absence of a
reference to the State as the actor limited by the state free speech
provision and conclude therefrom that the framers of our state constitution
intended to create a bold new right that conflicts with the fundamental

representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by way of addresses, petitions, or
remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer.”).
78
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVI (“The liberty of the press is essential to the security of
freedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth. The right of
free speech shall not be abridged.”). The latter sentence of this article was added by
amendment in 1948. MASS. CONST. amend. LXXVII.
79
Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 593 & n.8, 595 & n.11 (Mass.
1983). The court suggested that state action might not be required under the free speech
clause, but declined the question. Id. at 593 n.8.
80

MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. IX.

81

Batchelder, 445 N.E.2d at 593.

82

Id. at 593-94.

83

Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981) (construing
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right.”), amend. VII (reserving the power of initiative to
the people)).
84

For a discussion regarding the initiative power reserved to the people by Washington
Constitution amendment 7, see WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“[T]he people reserve to themselves
the power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the
legislature . . . .”).
85

Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 114-15.
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premise on which the entire constitution is based. To do so would not be
to “interpret” our constitution, but to deny its very nature.
The much more likely and reasonable explanation for the absence of the
words in question is that the framers viewed them as redundant and in the
interest of simplicity simply deleted them.86
The court further speculated that the framers might have departed from the
language of the First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law”) to clarify that the
provision restrained all state government, not just the legislature.87 Nevertheless, the
court let stand the earlier plurality conclusion, resting it solely on the initiative
provision. “[U]nlike the free speech provision,” the court reasoned, “the initiative
provision is not part of our state constitution’s Declaration of Rights and does not
establish a right against the government but declares that the people are part of the
legislative process.”88
Of the dozen states that rejected pleas for state constitutional protection of
expressive activity in shopping centers, barely three—Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and
arguably Ohio—clearly relied on textualist rationales in reaching conclusions
contrary to those of California, et al. Oregon seemed receptive to textualist analysis,
but so narrowed its level of abstraction as to discover “silence” on the state action
question.89 An affirmative reservation to the people of the initiative and referendum
power in that state90 said nothing about how signatures should be gathered,
propelling the court into other interpretivist modes.91
Pennsylvania’s Constitution contains plainly affirmative guarantees of free
expression and petition.92 But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court viewed the
provisions not in and of themselves, rather in the context of the entire document: a
change in the level of textualist abstraction bolstered by originalist interpretation.93

86

Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1287-88.

87

Id. at 1288. “Textualistically” speaking, the elimination of an actor altogether hardly
clarified the question of what actor is restrained.
88

Id. at 1289 (citing Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d 108, 120-21 (Dolliver, J., concurring)).

89

Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 P.3d 228 (Or. 2000).

90

OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

91

Stranahan, 11 P.3d at 239-41.

92

PA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the
invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”); id. § 20 (“The citizens have a right in a
peaceable manner to assemble together for their common good, and to apply to those invested
with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other proper purposes, by petition,
address or remonstrance.”). Section 7 further contains a negative statement on legislative
interference with the use of a printing press specifically “to examine the proceedings of the
Legislature or any branch of government[.]” Id. § 7.
93
W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331,
1334 (Pa. 1986). The contextual inquiry may be described as structural textualism, involving
the structure of a document, a concept apart from structuralism, involving the structure of the
governmental system a document describes. Id.
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At this broader level of abstraction, the court acknowledged that in the state’s 1776
constitution, civil liberties were stated in a second part of the document, apart from
governmental powers in the first; the second part was designed to serve as a
limitation on the first.94 Thus, the textual design demonstrated a state action
requirement in otherwise uncompromising affirmative statements of rights.95
In a methodically interpretivist approach to its state constitution, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court began with “plain meaning”96 and found that mixed affirmative and
negative clauses97 could not reasonably be misunderstood to create other than a right
against state action.98 The court perceived the latter negative clause as defining the
contours of the former, affirmative clause, rather than viewing the affirmative clause
as a separate statement with independent meaning.99 Ohio seemed to reach a similar
result in construing its mixed clauses100 when it concluded, with little additional
elaboration, that “the plain language . . . when read in its entirety,” contains a state
action requirement.101
Courts in Michigan, Connecticut, Arizona, Iowa, and New York rejected
textualist analyses for state rights unfettered by a state action requirement. Iowa and
New York, both with mixed affirmative/negative provisions,102 did not clearly
employ textualist analyses, but followed Michigan and Connecticut, respectively, in
rejecting textualist distinctions.103 The Arizona Court of Appeals implicitly rejected

94

Id. at 1335.

95

Id.

96

Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 836.

97

WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”).
98

Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 837. The court did concede that “[w]hether language of a statute
or constitutional provision is clear or ambiguous depends on the mind-set of the reader,” but
proceeded on its own “mind-set,” observing that of alternative reasonable interpretations, one
might be the only “correct” interpretation. Id.
99

Id.

100

OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11 (“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.”).
101

Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Ohio 1994) (emphasis added).

102

IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.”); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Every citizen may
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of
the press.”).
103
City of W. Des Moines v. Engler, 641 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Iowa 2002) (following
Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 344, 346); SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1214 (following Cologne
v. Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201, 1207-08 (Conn. 1984)).
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textualism in not responding directly to a litigant’s textualist arguments104 based on
an affirmative free speech provision and a negative, but passive voice and
unrestricted, free petition provision.105 Meanwhile the courts in Michigan and
Connecticut were unequivocal in their rejection of textualism. The Michigan
Supreme Court ruled specifically that there is no “significant” distinction in
affirmative and negative language choices, observing that the court had previously
construed Michigan constitutional text differently from the construction given to
identical text in the federal Constitution.106 Thus, the affirmative language of the
Michigan petition guarantee and the mixed language of the free speech clauses107
were of no importance. The Connecticut Constitution contains only affirmative
assertions of free speech and petition rights,108 but the Connecticut Supreme Court
similarly concluded that affirmative/negative variations were unhelpful in discerning
the framers’ intent.109
The Georgia Supreme Court did not address textualism in construing its
affirmative petition guarantee.110 The North Carolina Supreme Court, asked to
construe a negative, but passive and unrestricted, free speech provision, declined to
104

See Fiesta Mall Ventures v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1988).
105

ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 5 (“The right of petition, of the people to peaceably assemble for
the common good, shall never be abridged.”); id § 6 (“Every person may freely speak, write,
and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”). The court did
reason similarly to the Washington Supreme Court, but with a different result, in concluding
that the reservation of initiative and referendum power to the people did not constitute a
declaration of right, therefore was subject to a different state action analysis. Fiesta Mall
Ventures, 767 P.2d at 724-25 (construing ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1).
106

Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 345.

107

MICH. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The people have the right peaceably to assemble, to consult
for the common good, to instruct their representatives and to petition the government for
redress of grievances.”); id. § 5 (“Every person may freely speak, write, express and publish
his views on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right; and no law shall be
enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”).
108

CONN. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”); id. § 14 (The
citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common good, and to apply
to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper
purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.”).
109
Cologne, 469 A.2d at 1208-09. Though finding textual analysis unhelpful in this case,
the Connecticut court affirmed the importance of “the written document as a shield against the
arbitrary exercise of governmental power,” stating as follows: “This court has never viewed
constitutional language as newly descended from the firmament like fresh fallen snow upon
which jurists may trace out their individual notions of public policy uninhibited by the history
which attended the adoption of the particular phraseology at issue and the intentions of its
authors.” Id.
110

See Citizens for Ethical Gov’t, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assocs., 392 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. 1990)
(construing GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ 9 (“The people have the right to assemble peaceably for
their common good and to apply by petition or remonstrance those vested with the powers of
government for redress of grievances.”)).
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do so at all.111 And the South Carolina Supreme Court simply declared its free
expression provision as in harmony with the federal First Amendment;112 indeed the
language is nearly identical.113
In sum, textualism only mattered when it mattered; that is to say, generally, the
few courts that wished to take advantage of affirmative-negative language
distinctions employed textualism to do so, thus distinguishing their state
constitutional clauses from the Bill of Rights and augmenting state power to further
individual liberty interests. The majority of the courts studied, which chose not to
expand their state constitutional rights to protect expressive liberties in private
shopping centers, either rejected outright a distinction between affirmative and
negative language choices, or stretched textualist doctrine so as to construe
affirmative language as having only negative effect.
Interestingly, there was little or no correlation between the value a court placed
on textual distinctions and the affirmative or negative language of the constitutional
texts subject to construction. Of the five constitutional provisions at issue in the
“expansionist,” or pro-Pruneyard, states, three were mixed, employing both
affirmative and negative language, and only two were plainly affirmative. Of the
thirteen provisions114 that rendered no enhanced state power to further individual
liberties, only one—South Carolina—was plainly negative, like the federal First
Amendment. Four were mixed. One was passive but unrestricted, and a majority of
seven were plainly affirmative, thus distinguishable from the federal First
Amendment on their faces, but to no avail. Of the three majority jurisdictions that
explored textualism at all, two were in the “plainly affirmative” camp, and the other,
Wisconsin, involved mixed language.
Thus when textualism was employed, it enabled opposing results that could not
be predicted by reference to the analyzed text. Courts could take or leave textualism
regardless of the subject text, but courts that “took” textualism reached expansionist
results more often than not, in contravention of the majority rule. One can only
conclude that textualism is not a reliable or consistent predictor across jurisdictions.
B. If Not Textualism, What?
Originalism is the leading interpretivist tool when plain meaning fails. In this
study, it appeared in half of the cases; however, its treatment in the pro-Pruneyard
cases was thin. Structuralism—specifically the separation of powers between
judiciary and legislature—appeared frequently in the anti-Pruneyard camp, but
111

North Carolina v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708, 712 (N.C. 1981) (declining to construe N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 14 (“Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks of
liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but every person should be held responsible for
their abuse.”)).
112

Charleston Joint Venture v. McPherson, 417 S.E.2d 544, 548 n.7 (S.C. 1992).

113

Compare S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The General Assembly shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government or any department thereof for a redress of grievances.”), with U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
114

The reader will recall that Washington counts twice, so there are 17 jurisdictions and 18
constitutional authorities.
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hardly at all among pro-Pruneyard cases. Trends in state domestic case law were the
most effective predictors of courts’ conclusions. At the same time, trends in foreign
precedent were rejected as often as embraced. Finally, non-interpretivist public
policy arguments tended to be embraced by the pro-Pruneyard cases and rejected by
the anti-Pruneyard cases.
1. Originalism
According to the theory of originalism, constitutional language “should be
interpreted according to the intent of those who drafted and adopted it.”115
Originalism therefore permits inquiry into circumstantial evidence of drafters’, or
voters’, intent, just as legislative committee reports and floor debates are indicative
of statutory intent.
Originalism was invoked modestly by the court in Pruneyard; the textualist
assertion that the framers of the California Constitution deliberately chose not to
“adopt[] the words of the federal Bill of Rights”116 rings simultaneously of
originalism. The mode made similarly spare but perceptible appearances in the
reasoning of the Colorado and New Jersey courts. The former observed that an
expansive interpretation of individual rights under the Colorado Constitution was
consistent with “an opinion issued within a few years after the Colorado Constitution
was adopted and while its drafting was a living memory.”117 The New Jersey
Supreme Court observed that an expansive interpretation of its free speech and
assembly guarantees “comports with the presumed intent of those who framed our
Constitution.”118 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the Washington
Supreme Court plurality did not rely on originalist arguments.
Meanwhile, six of the thirteen anti-Pruneyard rulings invoked originalism. The
Connecticut court was especially artful in its assertion of originalism as an
interpretivist mode superior to any analytical approach that would result in activism:
This court has never viewed constitutional language as newly descended
from the firmament like fresh fallen snow upon which jurists may trace
out their individual notions of public policy uninhibited by the history
which attended the adoption of the particular phraseology at issue and the
intentions of its authors. The faith which democratic societies repose in
the written document as a shield against the arbitrary exercise of
governmental power would be illusory if those vested with the
responsibility for construing and applying disputed provisions were free to
stray from the purposes of the originators. “If the words have a doubtful
meaning, or are susceptible of two meanings, they should receive that
115
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (7th ed. 1999). On the importance of originalism in
constitutional interpretation, see generally, BERGER, supra note 14, at 3-20.
116

Robins, 592 P.2d at 346. Cf. supra text accompanying note 70.

117
Bock, 819 P.2d at 60 (citing Cooper v. Colo., 22 P. 790 (1889)). Arguably this phrase
better represents the theory of “original meaning” than “original intent.” These two concepts
are deliberately conflated in this study, as they are arguably conflated even in the Black’s Law
Dictionary definition of “originalism.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (7th. ed. 1999).
118

Schmid, 423 A.2d at 628 (citing monograph record of 1947 New Jersey constitutional
convention). Cf. supra text accompanying note 73.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

21

420

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:399

which will effectuate the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
general intent of the instrument.”119
The Washington Supreme Court majority decision similarly trumpeted the
superiority of originalism, in that case over textualism. In the passage quoted earlier
in reference to textualism,120 the court declined to infer drafter intent from a textual
omission.
The Michigan court referenced records of the 1961 and 1963 state constitutional
conventions to determine that a state action requirement was intended for the
Michigan free speech guarantee,121 and to demonstrate that the citizen initiative
process “was not intended to be easy to fulfill.”122 The same records of drafter intent
even superseded the effect of plain text. Though not in a dispositive holding, the
court wrote that the initiative and referendum provisions of the state constitution,
reserving power to the people, are self-executing, despite the constitutional decree
that “[t]he legislature shall implement the provisions of this section.”123
The courts in New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin also operated in the originalist
mode. The New York Court of Appeals, like the Michigan Supreme Court, found a
state action requirement for the New York Bill of Rights in the proceedings of the
1821 state constitutional convention. The Oregon court sought evidence both of
drafters’ intent and of voters’ understanding124 of relevant constitutional provisions
when they were adopted in 1902 and 1968 elections, but the court found no helpful
“objective materials.”125 The Wisconsin court rated originalist inquiries as secondary
to plain meaning, but asserted anyway that the anti-Pruneyard analysis accorded
with the “accurate and scholarly recitation of the history of [the state free speech
provision]” as rendered in an earlier concurring opinion.126 The court further stated
that any novel theory of constitutional interpretation advanced by a litigant must be
supported by originalist arguments.127
2. Structuralism
Structuralism “compar[es] the institutional capabilities of the judiciary with those
of legislatures” to determine when “the latter are probably better qualified to decide

119

Cologne, 469 A.2d at 1208 (quoting Borino v. Lounsbury, 86 A. 597 (1913)).

120

See supra text accompanying note 86.

121

Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 346 & n.25.

122

Id. at 350 & n.33 (quoting the convention record: “It’s tough. We want to make it
tough. It should not be easy. The people should not be writing the laws. That’s what we have
a senate and house of representatives for.”).
123

Id. at 348.

124

See supra text accompanying note 117 (regarding “original meaning”).

125

Stranahan, 11 P.3d at 243.

126

Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 837 (citing Jacobs v. Major, 390 N.W.2d 86 (Wis. Ct. App.
1986) (Gartzke, J., concurring)).
127

Id. at 841 (citing Jacobs, 390 N.W.2d 86).
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morally sensitive questions for the public.”128 Structuralism is commonly used as a
mode to buttress conclusions achieved through other interpretivist modes, namely
textualism and originalism,129 and so it is in the cases studied here.
Among Pruneyard and its progeny, only the Washington plurality decision
invoked a structuralist rationale. The court cited Federalist No. 51 in describing dual
sovereignty and separation of powers as providing a “double security” to the people
against abuse of power by government.130 Under this system, the judiciary is bound,
the court reasoned, to intervene as against the legislature when necessary to protect
individual rights.131 The court attributed “a reluctance by state courts to interpret and
to apply their state constitutions” to both “the failure of litigators to claim state
constitutional errors” and “the fact that often state and federal constitutions have
conferred the state protections.”132
Structuralism clearly cuts the other way, limiting judicial power, in five of the
anti-Pruneyard decisions, including the majority decision in Washington. Sharply
differing from the approach of the earlier plurality decision, the Washington
Supreme Court explained, quoting the American Jurisprudence encyclopedia, that
“American courts are constantly wary not to trench upon the prerogatives of other
departments of government or to arrogate to themselves any undue powers, lest they
disturb the balance of power . . . .”133 Simply employing a balancing test to reconcile
the competing constitutional interests in expression and property would “arrogat[e]
to the judicial branch . . . government powers that properly reside with the legislative
branch of government.”134
The Washington court then quoted the Connecticut court on the undesirability of
a balancing solution:
[T]he legislature . . . has far greater competence and flexibility to deal
with the myriad complications which may arise from the exercise of
constitutional rights by some in diminution of those of others. . . .
Statutes would become largely obsolete if courts in every instance of the
assertion of conflicting constitutional rights should presume to carve out

128
Mick, supra note 64, at 380. Structuralism may implicate comparisons between various
expressions, or institutions, of government, such as the state with the federal government, but
only the judiciary-legislature comparison pertains here. See, e.g., id. at 389-91.
129

See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 64, at 1189 n.16.

130

Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 113 (citing ALEXANDER HAMILTON OR JAMES MADISON,
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 339 (Modern Library ed. 1937)).
131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1288 (citing Wash. State Motorcycle Dealers
Ass’n v. Washington, 763 P.2d 442 (1988) (quoting 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law
§ 309, at 829-30 (1979))).
134

Id.
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in the immutable form of constitutional adjudication the precise
configuration needed to reconcile the conflict.135
The Supreme Court of Michigan similarly pointed to the legislature’s “superior
fact-finding ability and general legislative authority” to solve problems of conflicting
rights,136 and “judicial arrogation” in abrogating the state action requirement also
concerned the New York Court of Appeals.137 Finally, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, warning that courts must not “become mini-constitutional conventions,”
invoked structuralist reasoning to press the primacy of interpretivism, through
textualism and originalism, over activism.138
3. Precedentialism
Stare decisis, or adherence to precedent, rarely stands as a rationale apart, rather,
like structuralism, it tends to bolster conclusions derived through other interpretivist
modes. Moreover, reliance on precedents usually means reliance on previous
decisions that are in fact derived through other modes of analysis. Thus,
precedentialism in a given case might (or might not) in fact represent reliance on a
string of authorities that consistently adhere to an original vision. Nevertheless, in
time, principles derived from precedent can take on lives of their own, becoming
detached from their analytical roots. Such principles may even grow beyond the
analytical justifications that created them. Thus, one might argue that “the
Constitution can be understood only by uncovering the layers of practices,
conventions, and judicial decisions that have accumulated over centuries,” even to
the exclusion of “the Framer’s initial ‘commands.’”139 Reliance upon precedent,
therefore, appears in the case law absent any readily demonstrable association with
underlying modes of analysis. When this reliance occurs in the cases studied here,
the rationale is termed “precedentialist.”

135
Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1288-89 (quoting Cologne, 469 A. 2d at 1210).
In Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1289 n.25, the Washington Supreme Court also
pointed to the concurring opinion in Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental
Council, in which Justice Dolliver complained that the plurality employed constitutional
interpretation to usurp the legislative prerogative and “arrogate[] to the court powers
undreamed of by those who wrote and those who adopted our constitution,” Alderwood
Assocs., 635 P.2d at 119 (Dolliver, J., concurring). The majority in Southcenter Joint Venture
further observed that the judiciary must avoid infringement of the executive prerogative to
propose and veto legislation. Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1289.
136

Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 358.

137

SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1216-17 (quoting Montgomery v. Daniels, 340 N.E.2d
444, 451 (N.Y. 1975); citing Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 119 (Dolliver, J., concurring)).
138

Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 840 (“Courts would be ill-advised to rewrite history and plain,
clear constitutional language to create some new rights contrary to history. To do this courts
would become mini-constitutional conventions in individual court cases whenever a new
theory or philosophy became appealing. . . . That is not the right nor privilege of courts or
judges.”).
139
Pushaw, supra note 64, at 1202-03 (citing Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998); David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996)).
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In analyzing precedentialist rationales in the cases, it is important to distinguish
between reliance on “domestic” precedent, meaning a state court’s reliance on its
own prior case law, and perhaps that of subordinate state courts, and reliance on
“foreign” precedent, meaning a state court’s reliance on the precedents of other
states. The distinction is striking: trends in domestic precedents are effective
predictors of how a court solves the Pruneyard problem, while foreign precedents
are expressly rejected as often as embraced.
In the Pruneyard family of cases, four of the five jurisdictions relied on domestic
trends. The California and Colorado courts and the Washington plurality all referred
to domestic trends of expanded state constitutional rights, in relation to federal
counterparts.140 The Supreme Court of New Jersey embraced its own expansive
interpretation of state constitutional rights in a pre-Pruneyard criminal trespass
case.141 The fifth jurisdiction, Massachusetts, cited foreign precedent with
approval142—at the time of that decision in 1983, a majority of state court decisions
favored the Pruneyard reasoning—while the Washington plurality cited as
persuasive the foreign precedents in California and New Jersey.143 For its part, the
New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that most, but not all, foreign precedents
by 1994 were contrary to its decision.144
In the anti-Pruneyard family of cases, five of the thirteen jurisdictions—
Michigan, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Wisconsin—observed that their domestic
trends disfavored the expansive readings of implicated state constitutional provisions
sought by individual rights advocates.145 Nine of the thirteen jurisdictions referenced
foreign precedents. The courts in Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, New York, Ohio, and
Washington all recognized that they were following a majority trend.146 The
Michigan Supreme Court, before those six decisions, embraced the Connecticut
court’s reasoning and rejected Pruneyard and the Washington plurality ruling;147 the
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin courts followed suit.148
In review, courts that observed domestic trends to expand or to refrain from
expanding state constitutional rights tended subsequently to follow those trends.
Foreign trends, on the other hand, seem to lack such a grip. Pruneyard initially
140

Robins, 592 P.2d at 346-47; Bock, 819 P.2d at 59-60; Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at

113.
141

JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d at 760-61 (citing Schmid, 423 A.2d at 625-26 (also
observing domestic trend)). Cf. supra text accompanying note 73.
142

Batchelder, 445 N.E.2d at 594.

143

Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 115.

144

JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d at 769-70.

145

Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 344-45; SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1215; Eastwood
Mall, Inc., 626 N.E.2d at 61; Stranahan, 11 P.3d at 242-43; Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 838-39.
146

Fiesta Mall Venture, 767 P.2d at 722-23; Citizens for Ethical Gov’t, Inc., 392 S.E.2d at
9-10; Engler, 641 N.W.2d at 805; SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1214; Eastwood Mall, Inc.,
626 N.E.2d at 61; Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1289.
147

Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 357.

148

W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign, 515 A.2d at 1338-39; Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at
841-44.
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pulled in its wake the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the dubious
Washington plurality. But once the Connecticut court struck out in a different
direction, other courts piled on quickly, distancing themselves without difficulty
from the rapidly fading Pruneyard trend. Over only a year or two, an antiPruneyard trend emerged, and approval of foreign precedent again became the
fashion.
4. Public Policy
“Public policy” refers to reasoning that describes the best outcome for society.
Public policy rationales encompass reasoning based on “living constitutionalism,”
which seeks to interpret constitutional language “according to evolving notions of
justice, morality, and social progress.”149 While public policy reasoning radiates the
appeal of righteousness, Professor Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., observed that the notion of
evolving constitutional norms “seems to subvert the entire idea of a written
[c]onstitution, ratified by a supermajority of the People, that establishes a
fundamental and supreme law that binds everyone (including . . . judges).”150 For
this want of allegiance to the document being interpreted, or to its authors, public
policy is not an interpretivist tool. Nevertheless, public policy arguments may be
invoked by interpretivists to bolster decisions reached through interpretivist modes.
The legal realist recognizes that when the call is close on a given legal question,
public policy can be a strong motivator for a court. In the arena of state
constitutional interpretation, where, as thus far demonstrated, courts can disagree
sharply about a question as straightforward as difference in meaning between nearly
identical text, the calls are often close.
Individual rights advocates seeking state constitutional protection for expressive
conduct on private property universally press a single policy argument: that the
quasi-public spaces of large private shopping centers in the modern age are
analogous to the public squares of yore, so should be treated constitutionally as
public spaces where individuals may exercise civil liberties. This argument is the
same “functional equivalent” argument that drove the U.S. Supreme Court “company
town” decision in Marsh v. Alabama151—but drove it only so far.
Unsurprisingly, the Pruneyard progeny all followed California’s lead in
embracing the “functional equivalent” argument as a matter of desirable public
policy.152 The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, opined eloquently upon the
danger in “allow[ing] the vagaries of contemporary urban architecture and planning,
or the lack thereof, to prevail over our valued tradition of free speech.”153
149

Pushaw, supra note 64, at 1205 (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., Address to the Text and
Teaching Symposium, Georgetown Univ. (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE:
INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 11, 11, 14-17, 19-25 (1986)); see also Brennan,
supra note 36, at 503 (inviting “state courts to step into the breach” ).
150
Pushaw, supra note 64, at 1205 (citing LINO A. GRAGLIA, COURTING DISASTER: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE DEMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 5-38 (1997); ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38-47 (1997)).
151

326 U.S. 501 (1946).

152

Robins, 592 P.2d at 347; Bock, 819 P.2d at 62; JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d at 761,
766-67, 772-75; Batchelder, 445 N.E.2d at 595; Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 116.
153

Bock, 819 P.2d at 62.
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Among the anti-Pruneyard cases, nine of the thirteen decisions clearly
contemplated policy arguments. The courts in Arizona, Iowa, and Wisconsin found
simply that shopping centers are not the equivalent of public property or company
towns, the Wisconsin court observing that a shopping center “concerns itself only
with one facet of its patrons’ lives—how they spend their money.”154 The courts in
Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington went
further, rejecting public policy ends per se when they cannot be achieved through
legal means.155 Those courts struck at the Achilles heel of public policy arguments:
courts’ refusal to substitute judicial preferences for constitutional interpretations.
V. CONCLUSION: NOT TEXTUALISM, BUT NO CLEAR RULE;
AND A NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In the cases considered here, textualism tended to weigh heavily only when it
was consistent with courts’ conclusions on other grounds. Whether the language of
state constitutional provisions is affirmative or, like the First Amendment, negative,
is not, then, by itself helpful in predicting whether a state court will read the state
language expansively to protect individual liberties when federal constitutional
guarantees do not. The court that favors expansive construction likely will
contemplate textualist reasoning, whether or not the language is plainly
distinguishable, while the court disposed to restrictive construction of state-protected
liberties likely will either reject textualism or stretch textualist reasoning, perhaps by
changing the level of abstraction, to support the court’s conclusion.
If textualism did not drive these state court decisions, what did? The courts
expanding individual liberties under state constitutions treated originalism sparingly,
if at all. Meanwhile about half of jurisdictions declining to augment state
constitutional authority advanced originalism as a controlling mode of analysis.
Horizontal structuralism—particularly regarding the relationship of state judiciary
and legislature—appeared almost not at all in the pro-Pruneyard cases, but appeared
in five of the thirteen anti-Pruneyard decisions.
Domestic precedentialism was important to almost all of the Pruneyard cases and
to five of the thirteen anti-Pruneyard cases. Trends in domestic precedent
concerning the construction of state constitutional provisions were therefore better
correlated across the board to courts’ conclusions than any other mode of analysis.
Foreign precedentialism carried some weight in the few years following Pruneyard,
but courts readily abandoned the Pruneyard trend once a contrary example was set.
Foreign precedentialism soon thereafter regained momentum in the opposite
direction, suggesting that the rationale is pliable and unpredictable.
Finally, non-interpretivist public policy arguments tracked textualism in
significance. The pro-Pruneyard courts embraced both, while three anti-Pruneyard

154

Fiesta Mall Venture, 767 P.2d at 724 (quoting Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 845); Engler,
641 N.W.2d at 806.
155

Cologne, 469 A.2d at 1209-10; Citizens for Ethical Gov’t, Inc., 392 S.E.2d at 9;
Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 353, 357-58; SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1216; W. Pa. Socialist
Workers 1982 Campaign, 485 A.2d at 1336 (“Law and sociology are not coextensive.”);
Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1290-92 (“‘[W]hether [the “state action” requirement]
is good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political order.’” (emphasis removed)
(quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982))).
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decisions rejected the very same policy arguments on their merits. Six other antiPruneyard courts rejected public policy arguments per se, regarding them as
unpersuasive in state constitutional interpretation—much like the Michigan Supreme
Court rejected textualism, whether to read identical language similarly or to construe
affirmative language differently from negative.
This Article reviews a narrow range of case law in an effort to make
generalizations about state constitutional interpretation. In the end, one can say that
generally, from a multi-state perspective, textual distinction between affirmative and
negative language in state constitutional provisions is not indicative of the import of
those provisions relative to their federal constitutional counterparts. This conclusion
begs for further research to ask, why not? How can some courts acknowledge that
the plain difference between affirmative and negative language is all-important,
while other courts can find it utterly insignificant? Courts point to other
interpretivist tools, such as originalism, to bolster anti-textualist conclusions.
Historical research is required to determine whether in fact the nearly identical
language in various state constitutions is properly understood to have been implanted
with such diverse intentions.156
In examining modes of analysis besides textualism, generalizations are difficult
to draw.157
Other interpretivist tools—originalism, structuralism, and
precedentialism—and public policy are each at times highly influential. But none of
these approaches dominates. True, trends in domestic precedent seem best predictive
of a court’s ultimate decision. But that result is disappointing. Domestic precedent
by itself is something of an empty rationale, as one might expect that principles
repeated in domestic precedent must have emerged historically from some other
analytical approach. Thus, this dependence on domestic precedent invites further
research: Where does California and New Jersey activism come from?158 Why is no
similar trend apparent in South Carolina (nor in any southern state)? And ultimately,
how are activist trends started or stopped?
Most importantly, with regard to needed further research, the generalizations
drawn in this study should be tested against other pools of case law. Are the same
trends evidenced in state decisions on search and seizure? Cruel and unusual
punishment? Due process and equal protection? Through these additional inquiries,
one can refine these results and eliminate variations that might depend on the subject
matter of the constitutional question at issue.159
156

Cf. Simon, supra note 16, at 309-20. A correct answer might evade even the most
vigorous originalist inquiry, as, according to Professor Simon, “these early state constitutional
provisions were adopted virtually without discussion or analysis. Their meanings and
applications apparently were considered universally understood.” Id. at 310 (footnote
omitted). Nevertheless, Professor Simon concluded in 1985 that “[a] logical starting point for
a solution to disparate decisions would be intense study and reflection on the actual
differences in various state provisions. Opposite results on similar language are difficult to
accept.” Id. at 339.
157

This result is consistent with the findings of Professor Simon. See Simon, supra note
62, at 320-37.
158

See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 149, at 498-99 (discussing innovations in state
constitutional rights in, inter alia, California and New Jersey: “Enlightenment comes also
from the New Jersey Supreme Court”).
159

Cf. supra discussion of Fine et al., accompanying note 66.
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At least in the narrow realm of expressive activity in private shopping centers,
the present trend in state decisions disfavors the augmentation of state constitutional
liberties. Nevertheless, under the system of dual sovereignty, in part preserved
through the Tenth Amendment, states retain the power to buck that trend. Perhaps,
as the Washington plurality suggested, state courts are reluctant to apply their state
constitutions because litigators fail to raise the claims. Perhaps state courts simply
do not want the aggravation of litigation that might result from new doctrines in state
constitutional law.
In Arkansas, it appeared that aggravation with a U.S. Supreme Court remand,
rather than with litigants, led to expansive construction of state constitutional
equivalents to the Fourth Amendment.160 In two cases in 2002, the ordinarily
decorous Arkansas Supreme Court surprised criminal defense attorneys when it
departed from precedent that had regarded state constitutional liberties as
coextensive with federal constitutional law.161 Advocates who desire such outcomes,
and those who do not, stand to gain from continuing research into the reasoning of
state courts in cases of individual liberties under state constitutions.

160
See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 216-22 (Ark. 2002), on remand from 532
U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam), rev’g 16 S.W.3d 551, denying reh’g on 11 S.W.3d 526 (Ark.
2000). In Professor Simon’s typology, see supra note 62, this state decision is clearly
“reactive.” See Simon, supra note 16, at 315-17.
161

Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d at 216-21 (distinguishing, among other things, Stout v. Arkansas,
898 S.W.2d 457 (Ark. 1995)); Griffin v. Arkansas, 67 S.W.3d 582, 584-85 (Ark. 2002).
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